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(Why) Do Central Banks Care About Their Profits? 
 
Abstract 
 
We document that central banks are significantly more likely to report slightly positive profits 
than slightly negative profits. The discontinuity in the profit distribution is (i) more pronounced 
amid greater political or public pressure, the public’s receptiveness to more extreme political 
views, and agency frictions arising from governor career concerns, but absent when no such 
factors are present, and (ii) correlated with more lenient monetary policy inputs and greater 
inflation. These findings indicate that profitability concerns, while absent from standard 
theoretical models of central banking, are both present and effective in practice, and inform a 
theoretical debate about monetary stability and the effectiveness and riskiness of non-traditional 
central banking. 
JEL-Codes: E580. 
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“Central bankers frequently say … profits are an afterthought to higher economic goals, such as 
controlling inflation. Even losses aren’t such a big deal …”           Wall Street Journal, May 8 2016 
 
“…to many Eurozone central bankers the idea that a central bank might lose money seems almost 
taboo, if not shameful; it undercuts everything that is supposed to make a central bank credible.”  
Financial Times, February 16, 2012 
 
“[T]he fear of losses could deter [central banks] from pursuing policies that would benefit the 
broader economy, economists and former central bankers say... In Japan in the 1990s, concerns over 
potential losses appear to have lessened the central bank’s resolve to expand its balance sheet 
aggressively…”        Wall Street Journal, May 8 2016 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Do central banks care about the sign and size of their profits? The answer to this question is a 
crucial determinant for the effectiveness of standard and non-standard monetary policy, as well as for 
long-term monetary stability. According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963), the Fed’s fear of losses 
was a factor preventing an aggressive expansionary response to the Great Depression. The question 
is timely again as the widespread adoption of non-traditional monetary policy, with large-scale asset 
purchases both in the US and the Euro area, mechanically link interest rate changes to central bank 
profits,1 and as politicians even in advanced economies link the continuation of central bankers’ 
careers to their policy choices.2  
Commensurate with the importance of the question, a high-powered theoretical debate has 
emerged. One strand debates the normative question under which conditions central banks should or 
should not care about their profitability. Other authors assume central banks care at least about the 
sign of their profits, and show which desirable and undesirable consequences such preferences or 
constraints might bring about. Interestingly, however, the debate thus far lacks an empirical 
investigation into its premise—namely, the positive question whether central banks are in fact 
                                                          
1 “…analysts had widely expected the ECB to start buying bonds yielding less than its deposit rate of minus 0.4% ... But 
Bundesbank President Jens Weidmann warned shortly before the ECB’s March policy meeting that such a move would 
lead to “guaranteed losses” for the central bank. The ECB subsequently left its deposit-rate floor in place but said it would 
start buying corporate bonds.” (“Windfall for Central Banks Fuels Political Pressure”, Wall Street Journal, May 8 2016). 
2 “[Trump] left open the possibility of renominating Federal Reserve Chairwoman Janet Yellen once her tenure is up next 
year, a shift from his position during the campaign that he would “most likely” not appoint her to another term. “I do like 
a low-interest rate policy, I must be honest with you,” Mr. Trump said at the White House, when asked about Ms. Yellen.” 
(Wall Street Journal, April 12 2017; see also Reuters, April 12 2017).  
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concerned with the level or sign of their profits. Of course, investigating this question is difficult, 
given that counterfactual profit levels are in general difficult to observe. This paper provides a first 
answer by focusing on a set of central-bank-year observations for which the counterfactual can 
arguably be discerned with some confidence. 
Using a large sample of more than 150 central banks spanning more than twenty years, we 
document that central banks are discontinously more likely to report small positive profits than small 
negative profits. The significance and magnitude of the discontinuity varies predictably with various 
incentives of central bankers (such as measures of the level of political pressure to produce profits, 
the public’s receptiveness to more extreme political views, central bankers’ career incentives, etc.) as 
well as with measures of the central banks’ ability to control their reported income (such as exposure 
to foreign exchange risk and accounting rules). Moreover, a discontinuity is present only if there are 
enough such factors present. Hence, the discontinuity is unlikely to be a mechanical byproduct of the 
central banking business model, and more likely the result of imperfect de facto independence of the 
central bank. 
The fact that central banks appear to care about the sign of the profits they report is prima 
facie evidence for the importance central bankers pay to the public’s perception of their profitability. 
However, some implications of this finding depend on whether the discontinuity in central bank 
profits is more likely solely due to accounting manipulations such as income smoothing—or if, by 
contrast, profitability concerns are also related to policy choices, as suggested in the commentary and 
press reports cited above. We find that the discontinuous propensity to avoid losses is related to (i) 
discontinuously smaller Taylor rule coefficients and (ii) higher inflation, both in levels and relative 
to target. These results are robust to controlling for country fixed effects. Whereas the level of 
inflation and short-term interest rates in a country can be related to the central bank’s level of profits 
for various reasons, it is more difficult to imagine why those variables would be discontinously 
different for central banks whose profits are slightly above or slightly below zero, if not because both 
policy rules and profit levels are endogenous choice variables that respond to the same underlying 
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factors. Therefore, these results suggest more than a spurious link between the degree of central 
banks’ loss aversion and monetary policy choices. 
The usefulness of our findings lies in their potential to (i) help assess the likely applicability 
of existing theories that vary in the extent to which they assume central banks have profitability or 
capital concerns, and (ii) help inform future theoretical modeling. Regarding the former, Sims (2005) 
shows that central bank capital concerns can lead to self-fulfilling hyperinflation equilibria. Jeanne 
and Svensson (2007) emphasize that resulting inflationary expectations can enable the economy to 
escape a liquidity trap. Berriel and Bhattarai (2009) embed an exogenous positive-profit constraint in 
a dynamic new Keynesian model and show that the constraint renders the central bank to distort its 
policy choices, making it less effective at governing the quantity of money, inflation, and the output 
gap.  
Hall and Reis (2015) agree with the logic of that conclusion, but question its key assumption. 
They ask the normative question of why a central bank should ever care about its profits, and provide 
sufficient conditions that make profit concerns irrelevant, in theory.3 These conditions include that 
the central bank can accrue earnings before or after a negative capital shock to smooth its budget 
constraint, that political pressures and career concerns do not affect policy choices, and that the public 
understands the logic of central bank accounting. Under these assumptions, profits should be entirely 
irrelevant to central banks; profits are not an “afterthought,” but no thought at all. Yet, Archer and 
Moser-Boehm (2013, 1) point out that even if all these conditions are met, “markets may 
[nevertheless] react badly in the false belief that losses imply a loss of policy effectiveness” (emphasis 
added); central bank behavior may anticipate such reactions. Therefore, an empirical test of the 
positive prediction that central banks are entirely impervious to their profits is important, despite the 
clarity of the existing theoretical investigations into the question.  
                                                          
3 Less closely related, Mendes and Berriel (2015) point out that a positive-profit constraint is also what can make 
quantitative easing effective because it turns large-scale asset purchases into a commitment device to keep future rates 
low; a conclusion challenged by Correia et al. (2013). Reis (2016) explains how quantitative easing can be an effective 
tool to respond to fiscal crises. 
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Our findings reject the null hypothesis that central banks are indifferent to their profitability. 
One may hence conclude that future modeling should entertain the notion that profits are an important 
consideration in central banking.4 However, our design does not have the power to reject that profits 
are irrelevant to any particular central bank in the sample. Hence, a nuanced interpretation of our 
findings is in order, which we attempt in the conclusions.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our key testable hypotheses and explains 
the intuition behind our tests. Section 3 describes our data and their sources. Section 4 reports our key 
findings on loss avoidance. Section 5 reports results on policy inputs and outcomes. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Testable hypotheses and empirical strategy 
The primary goal of the present paper is to test whether central banks report higher profits 
when “frictions” that may favor the generation of profits are more pronounced.5 The counterfactual 
profit level is the one that would have occurred if such frictions had not been present, or had been 
present to a lesser extent. The null hypothesis is that central banks’ policies and accounting profits 
are entirely determined by fundamental factors. Under that hypothesis, there is no difference between 
actual and counterfactual profit levels. The alternative hypothesis is that central banks produce higher 
profits than they otherwise would have when certain frictions are present.  
The empirical challenge is that, for any central bank-year observation and the corresponding 
level of “frictions,” the counterfactual is impossible to observe directly; it is therefore difficult to 
distinguish the alternative from the null hypothesis for a generic central-bank-year observation. The 
key idea of the present paper is to focus on a subset of observations for which we can arguably elicit 
an average counterfactual with some confidence: those banks that report profits just above or below 
zero. 
                                                          
4 Reis (2015) points out that period-insolvency can lead to rule-insolvency in his discussion of Del Negro and Sims (2015). 
5 We use the term “frictions” to refer to balance sheet or income-related factors that may affect central banks’ policy.  
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The argument underlying our first set of tests is that in a frictionless world, there is no strong 
reason why a central bank would generate a very small profit as opposed to a very small loss. The 
reason is that zero is not a fundamentally important number in a neoclassical theory of central 
banking—indeed, profits are supposed to be entirely irrelevant. The profit distribution should 
therefore be smooth; a discontinuity in the profit distribution at any point would be unexpected in a 
frictionless model.6 By contrast, a discontinuity is a natural consequence of a model in which profit 
concerns play a role. In particular, if central banks (or, more specifically, the agents acting on its 
behalf) care about the sign of the central bank’s profits, and if the agents have the ability to affect the 
profit levels, one should expect to see that, on the margin, central banks are more likely to report 
small profits than small losses. Formally, the empirical hypotheses are: 
H0: There is no discontinuity in any set of central banks’ profit distribution. 
H1: There is a discontinuity at zero in central banks’ profit distribution. 
H1a: The discontinuity is more pronounced when factors that might increase incentives or ability to 
manage profits are more pronounced. 
H1b: There is no discontinuity in samples in which no such factors are present. 
To examine these hypotheses, we test for a discontinuity in central banks’ profit distribution 
around zero, and check whether the magnitude and significance of the discontinuity vary with various 
factors that proxy for incentives and ability to increase profits. (To conserve space, we only give an 
exhaustive list of such factors in the empirical section. They cover a variety of economic, political, 
behavioral, agency, and accounting considerations.)7 
In our second set of tests, we investigate whether the discontinuity in the profit distribution is 
more likely to be the result of accounting manipulations alone, or whether there is suggestive evidence 
                                                          
6 This is in contrast to for-profit entities, for which a discontinuity at zero profits is well documented (see e.g., Burgstahler 
and Dichev 1997; Burgstahler and Chuk 2017; Leuz et al. 2003; Bergstresser et al. 2006). 
7 Various measures of incentives and ability to increase profits (described below) may also give rise to higher central bank 
profits more generally. However, we can only observe a counterfactual profit level for banks around the zero-profit 
threshold. Our focus is thus explained by the desire to establish internal validity of the notion that certain factors induce 
central banks to take actions that influence their reported profits. The downside of our approach is that the empirical 
results, and in particular the magnitude of the estimated coefficients, may not enjoy strong external validity. 
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that the discontinuity is also associated with changes in the central banks’ policy choices and 
outcomes. The theoretical basis for the latter hypothesis is well-grounded in theory. For example, in 
Hall and Reis (2015), the absence of full and frictionless fiscal support can set the central bank on a 
path of exploding reserves; a positive-profit constraint can have a similar effect (Berriel and Bhattarai 
2009). One may also hypothesize that fiscal support for the central bank is less likely to be expected 
in a country run by a populist government, given that such a country’s population seems less 
perceptive to subtle arguments about central bank accounting and their relation to public finance. The 
central bank may thus react with more caution to avoid shortfalls in such a situation. It can do so, 
among others, by modifying its policy choices. For example, the fear of balance sheet losses can give 
incentives to central banks to delay increases in interest rates as the economy recovers, leading to 
higher inflation rates (see, among others, Bhattarai et al. 2015; Mendes and Berriel 2015; Del Negro 
and Sims 2015). 
We empirically examine whether central banks’ tendency to avoid losses affects policy by 
testing if the tendency to avoid losses is associated with differences in Taylor rule coefficients and 
inflation gaps across country-years with varying levels of incentive and ability factors present. If loss-
avoidance matters for policy choices, Taylor rule coefficients should be smaller for central banks that 
report a small profit relative to central banks that report a small loss on average, and average inflation 
rates (or inflation gaps relative to target) should be systematically higher. A placebo test is that no 
discontinuity should be present at any other point in the profit distribution. By contrast, if the sign of 
profits is irrelevant for policy choices, short-term rates and inflation should not discontinuously 
change at any point of the profit distribution, including zero.  
Whereas we control for a variety of country- and time-specific factors with fixed effects and 
a variety of explicit controls, conceptual problems associated with estimating Taylor rule coefficients 
and standard concerns with cross-county analyses imply that the results of our second set of tests 
should be viewed as suggestive, not conclusive. 
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3. Data 
We use data from five data sources: Bankscope, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
the International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World Bank, and from the central bank literature. 
Financial statement information such as central bank profitability, components of central bank income 
and expenses, and accounting rules come from Bankscope. Central banks measure assets and income 
either following accounting rules that also apply to commercial banks (e.g., International Financial 
Reporting Standards, IFRS), or specifically developed accounting rules. We use financial statements 
and measures reflecting the accounting rules that apply to the particular central bank. We collect 
information from both consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements because some central 
banks report both sets of accounts and we have no priors that they manage profit in one, but not the 
other type of accounts.8   
We measure central bank profitability as the return on assets (ROA): the ratio of net income 
over total assets, whereas total assets are calculated as the average between the beginning and end of 
the fiscal year to which the net income calculation applies. For inclusion in the sample we require 
that a central bank has information on net income and total assets in the current and previous year 
(i.e., the information needed to measure a central bank’s profitability—our key variable). Our analysis 
focuses on national central banks and excludes data on supranational central banks (ECB) and local 
central bank branches. This procedure yields a sample of 2,591 bank-year observations that covers a 
23-year period and 155 countries. (By way of comparison, there are currently 193 United Nations 
member states.) 
Table 1 provides an overview of our primary sample of central banks. The starting point of 
our analysis is 1992, when Bankscope begins coverage of central banks. As can be observed in Table 
1, not all countries have data for all years. The average number of observations per country is 16.7, 
with high-income countries having a more complete coverage. Low-income countries have lower 
                                                          
8 This implies that we sometimes have two observations for each bank-year. In robustness checks, we repeat our key 
analyses after excluding the “duplicate” observations for central banks that report both sets of financial statements.  
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coverage, especially in the earlier years. In the analysis that follows, we examine the robustness of 
our key results across time and across high and low income countries. 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
We complement the Bankscope data with data from several sources. Information about central 
banks’ dividend distribution rules comes from the BIS (Archer and Moser-Boehm 2013). 
Macroeconomic indicators such as economic development (high/low income countries), inflation 
rates, and growth rates of GDP come from the World Bank. We obtain data on short-term interest 
rates from the IMF. Dincer and Eichengreen (2014) and Dreher et al. (2008) provide information on 
central bank independence and the central bank’s governor tenure, respectively. We use political party 
affiliation of the country’s chief executive from Beck et al. (2001) (which covers 179 countries up to 
2012). We obtain data on country institutional characteristics such as government effectiveness, rule 
of law, and corruption from Kaufmann et al. (2010). Data on banking, currency, and sovereign crises 
are taken from Laeven and Valencia (2012). Table A1 in the Appendix reports detailed definitions 
and data sources for the variables used in the paper.   
Not all variables are available for all central banks and/or for the entire sample period. 
Therefore, in what follows, we begin with a detailed descriptive analysis of the propensity to avoid 
losses and various country-year characteristics whereas we consider the role of one factor at a time. 
After that, we turn to a multivariate regression framework, which gives an indication to which extent 
the correlation structure between various factors affect their respective roles in shaping central banks’ 
loss-avoidance, but also suffers more from missing observations.  
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4. Results 
4.1. Is there a discontinuity in central banks’ profits distribution? 
The top panel of Figure 1 reports the distribution of central bank “profits” (net income scaled 
by average total assets) for all observations in our sample (truncated at +/- 9% for better readability).9 
We observe an abrupt increase in the number of observations after the zero-profits threshold.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
We use a McCrary (2008) test to formally test whether the discontinuity around zero is 
statistically significant.10 The bottom panel of Figure 1 plots the expected number of earnings 
observations and confidence intervals for the intervals to the left and to the right of the zero-profit 
threshold. The resulting confidence intervals to the left and to the right of zero do not overlap, 
indicating that the discontinuity is statistically significant. The formal test reported in the upper left 
corner of Figure 1.II indicates indeed that the discontinuity is strongly statistically significant at the 
1% level. 
Next, we examine whether this discontinuity is present throughout our sample period and 
across high- and low-income countries. To do so, we first split our sample in three sub-samples, one 
for each decade in our sample: 1992-1999, 2000-2009, and 2010-2014. Figure 2 shows the 
discontinuity is present for each of the three decades spanned by our sample. In unreported tests, we 
also confirm that the discontinuity is present in both crisis and non-crisis periods. In Figure 3 we 
distinguish between high- and low-income countries in a similar way. Results indicate that the 
discontinuity is present for both sets of countries. This finding rejects the plausible hypothesis that 
loss aversion is only a feature of low-income countries, where the rule of law and institutions may be 
poorer. 
(Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here) 
                                                          
9 We use the optimal bin size, which is proportional to the interquartile range of the distribution and the sample size (see 
Scott 1992). In our sample, the optimal bin size is 0.003. 
10 Based on McCrary (2008), we use a nonparametric local polynomial density estimator to examine the continuity of 
profits’ density function in the neighborhood of the threshold. 
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Next, we examine whether the discontinuity is an artifact of pooling together central banks 
that never make losses with central banks that do. In our sample, out of 127 central banks for which 
we have at least 10 observations, 43 central banks have never reported losses during the sample 
period.11 Removing these central banks from our sample does not change the results. Figure 4 reports 
the profits distribution for central banks that report a loss at least once during the sample period and 
for which we have at least 10 observations. Like before, we observe a significant discontinuity at 
zero. 
(Insert Figure 4 about here) 
Overall, using a large sample of central banks we find that central banks’ profits exhibit a 
sharp discontinuity at the zero-profit threshold. This pattern is present throughout the sample period 
as well as across high- and low-income countries and it is not an artifact of pooling.  
These findings reject the null hypothesis, but support the alternative Hypothesis H1.  This is 
true irrespective of whether the discontinuity is mainly driven by shifting of profits from the small-
loss to the small-profit region which would result in increases in average profits, or by mean-
preserving profit smoothing over time.12 
In what follows, we aim to inform more thoroughly the interpretation of these results by 
testing the sub-hypotheses H1a and H1b, thus shedding light on the cross-sectional determinants of 
the discontinuity. 
 
                                                          
11 Central banks are differentially exposed to losses. For example, comparing central banks that never experienced losses 
during the sample period with central banks that experienced losses at least once reveals that the former are more likely 
to use IFRS that requires mark-to-market accounting, to have a currency peg, and to experience a currency crisis, a 
sovereign crisis, or a sovereign restructuring. They are less likely to experience a banking crisis and have similar foreign 
assets to total assets ratios. We also find that central banks that pay interest on their liabilities are marginally more likely 
to experience losses (94.32% of observations in our sample have positive interest expenses, with average interest expense 
equal to 68.15% of interest income). We also note that the distributional properties of ROA are not consistent with the 
view that central banks are generally immune to losses and make stable profits that do not change much over time. The 
overall standard deviation of ROA is 0.062, with within and between variation equal to 0.054 and 0.034, respectively. 
Similarly, the persistence coefficient of ROA is 0.644, which is quite low and is comparable to the persistence that prior 
studies estimate for US listed firms (about 0.7-0.8). See Sloan (1996). 
12 The histograms are more likely with the former hypothesis: they show much larger change in the number of observations 
between the small-loss region and the small-profit region than between the small-profit region and the interval 
immediately to the right of it (the odds ratio of 5.26 vs. 1.36). A thorough analysis distinguishing between the  “profit-
lifting” and “income-smoothing” channels would suffer from selection problems owing to variation in the availability of 
time-series information across central banks and is therefore omitted. 
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4.2. Which factors drive the discontinuity? 
In this section we aim to uncover the factors (frictions) that drive central banks’ incentives 
and ability to avoid losses, and investigate whether the discontinuity disappears when no (or not 
sufficiently many) such factors are present. By doing so, we not only answer the question which 
factors are more likely to make central banks loss-averse, but also attenuate the likelihood that the 
discontinuity is a mechanical byproduct of the “traditional” central bank business model.13  
Hard vs. soft budget constraints 
We begin by exploring the role of central banks’ dividend distribution rules. As shown in the 
extant theoretical literature, dividend distribution rules influence whether central banks can soften 
their budget constraints (Hall and Reis 2015). Central banks whose charter allows for negative 
dividends can draw on external resources to cover their obligations when internally generated income 
is insufficient; the ability to reduce dividend payments to the government below the level of period-
profits to absorb future or past losses serves a similar function. Such central banks may have weaker 
or no incentives to avoid losses, because they face no risk of period-insolvency.  
In a first test of the hard vs. soft budget constraint hypothesis, we use information on the 
central banks’ dividend distribution rules in each country. This information is only available for 30 
countries from Archer and Moser-Boehm (2013, Annex 2). Our second approach uses central banks’ 
actual dividend payments during the sample period. This data is available for most central banks in 
our sample. In the first approach, we label central banks that can draw on external resources to cover 
losses or that are allowed to reduce dividend payments to cover future or past losses as having a “soft” 
budget constraint.14 This group includes Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, India, Israel, 
Germany, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, 
                                                          
13 It may be the case that central bank assets and liabilities are such that they are more likely to generate small profits than 
losses or large profits. For example, the Federal Reserve has until recently earned “high income from holding short-term 
bonds, funded almost entirely with currency, low reserves, and zero or low interest paid on reserves” (Hall and Reis 2015, 
12). 
14 The latter includes: i) central banks that face an equity target (or equivalent) that allows future surpluses to be retained 
to an unusual extent to cover losses and/or rebuild equity or allows to build buffers towards a target level, ii) central banks 
that have full discretion in the determination of general purpose provivisions without any specific limit, and iii) central 
banks with smooth distributions, where dividends are determined based on a trailing average of net income in past years. 
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Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and US. We assign all remaining 
central banks from the Archer and Moser-Boehm sample into a second group. These central banks 
are either substantially limited in the amount of profits they can retain or their dividend distribution 
decisions are taken jointly with the government. We label these central banks as facing a “hard” 
budget constraint and expect them to have greater incentives to avoid losses. This group includes 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.  
Using the second approach, we say that central banks with negative dividends at some point 
during the sample period or with consistently low dividend payout ratios throughout the sample 
period, face “softer” budget constraints than central banks with consistently high payout ratios 
throughout the sample period or central banks that pay dividends even when they make losses. To 
distinguish between high and low dividend payout ratios, we use the top tertile of the payout 
distribution as a cutoff point. This corresponds to a payout ratio of 90%. We thus posit that central 
banks with average payout ratios lower than 90% have a greater ability to build buffers and smooth 
intertemporally than those with payout ratios greater or equal to 90%.15 We also contrast the top and 
the bottom tertiles of the distribution. The bottom tertile has a payout ratio of 50%. Doing so yields a 
classification more similar to the one obtained using the dividend rules.16 
Figure 5 reports the distribution for central bank profits for each of the resulting groups. Both 
approaches yield similar insights. The discontinuity is significantly more pronounced for central 
banks with “hard” budget constraints. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that these central 
banks have stronger incentives to avoid losses, but inconsistent with the null hypothesis that central 
banks with soft budget constraints are generally oblivious to the profits they report. (When using the 
second approach, differences between the two groups are more pronounced when allowing for larger 
                                                          
15 We add central banks that pay dividends in the presence of losses to the group of central banks with consistently high 
dividend payout ratios throughout the sample period. Central banks that receive dividends from the government (i.e., 
report negative dividends) are added to the group of central banks that have low payout ratios. 
16 For the overlapping sample, the correlation between the classifications under the two approaches is 0.48 when allowing 
for a larger disparity in the payout ratios of the two groups as opposed to 0.12 when using the 90% cut-off.  
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disparities in their payout ratios.) These findings indicate that flexible distribution rules are not 
sufficient to remove central banks’ incentives to avoid losses. 
(Insert Figure 5 about here) 
The finding that a profit discontinuity is present even under flexible distribution rules suggests 
that other frictions may be at work. For example, even if the central bank’s dividend distribution rules 
provide for automatic recapitalizations by tapping into the central government’s resources, central 
bank losses may be met with discontent on behalf of politicians. If such political discontent enters the 
calculation of central bankers, incentives to avoid losses may be present even if there is no de jure 
reason. (Indeed, a mere reduction in the central bank’s contribution to government revenue can 
generate a political backlash.) 
One may further hypothesize that the incentives to avoid losses are greater when the political 
pressure is greater, or when the central bankers are more receptive to it for one reason or another. In 
the analyses that follow, we thus explore the role of political, behavioral, agency, and other frictions 
that may favor loss-avoidance under the alternative hypothesis (but of course not under the null 
hypothesis, which holds that profits are entirely irrelevant to central banks). 
Political pressure and career concerns 
Political pressures on central banks may arise for various reasons. One is budgetary 
considerations. Governments may become accustomed to receiving dividends from central banks to 
support their budgets and avoid unpopular increases is taxation.17  Failing to provide a constant stream 
of dividends may bring central banks under pressure to continue to produce profits.18 We expect that 
such pressures are greater when central bank profitability has a relatively greater impact on the 
                                                          
17 For example, the Federal Reserve has sent close to $100bn in profits per year to the Treasury in the recent past. This 
income stream to the government is bound to shrink when the Fed raises interest rates or shrinks its balance sheet (Wall 
Street Journal, January 10 2017); see also https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/notes/feds-notes/2017/confidence-
interval-projections-of-the-federal-reserve-balance-sheet-and-income-20170113.html. 
18 Anecdotal evidence for this idea is plentiful. For example, “[o]ne rationale for the SNB “gold initiative” was to bullet-
proof the SNB's balance sheet against losses… The fear was that the SNB’s balance-sheet losses might anger cantonal 
leaders to such a degree that the central bank's independence would be threatened” (see Eichengreen and Weder de Mauro, 
Project Syndicate, February 12, 2015). In a similar tone, the Banque de France in its 2010 annual report states that “[t]he 
strict management… of its invested monetary income is the best guarantee of the Banque de France’s independence. This 
strict management allows the Bank to: finance its development completely independently, while also paying a regular 
dividend to the French State…” (p. 57). 
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government’s budget, or when the central bank faces a more fiscally conservative government that is 
more concerned with the government’s budget. To the extent that the size of the central bank’s scope 
relative to the government’s budget is predetermined, this treatment affords some degree of 
exogenous variation. One might also hypothesize that an extreme government of any orientation may 
be more prone to the populistic idea to use central bank profits to fund the government. In such an 
environment, the central banks’ profit level might be subject to more scrutiny, and the central bank 
may be more keen to avoid headlines triggered by negative profits. 
Relatedly, loss-avoidance may also be rooted in central banks’ concerns that losses will be 
interpreted as signs of “bad” policies and “weak” central banks, even if such interpretations would be 
unfounded, irrational, or due to “behavioral” factors not easily captured by neoclassical models. We 
expect that such pressures are likely stronger when countries are governed by extreme political parties 
or when central banks are publicly traded. When countries are governed by extreme nationalist or 
populist parties, central banks may find it more difficult to convince governments or the public on 
the necessity of occasional negative profits; losses are more likely to be interpreted as evidence of 
failed policies and weak central banks in need of ad hoc recapitalizations or politicized at the expense 
of the central bank. Moreover, although central banks with private shareholders are institutionally 
shieled from market pressures,19 any losses they may generate are more likely to receive public 
attention. (Publicly traded central banks hold press conferences to discuss their financial performance 
and issue profit warnings that may draw attention to balance sheet considerations.)  
Pressures to avoid losses may also interact with career concerns of central bank governors. If 
governments, politicians or the public view losses as a sign of failure, central bank governors may 
have incentives to avoid losses, particularly when they are re-appointable. Ex ante, one might also 
guess that pressures and political interference may also be larger in countries where central banks 
                                                          
19 “The rights of ordinary shareholders to select management and determine strategy are severely circumscribed, and 
allow no role in the formulation of public policy. Dividends to private shareholders are predetermined or limited in law, 
making these central banks wholly or mostly independent of the profit motive, and removing a potential conflict of interest 
between financial advantage and public welfare” (Archer and Moser-Boehm 2013, 7).  
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enjoy less de jure independence and where the quality of institutions and respect of law is lower 
(though we offer a reinterpretation of that hypothesis below). 
Figure 6 explores the respective roles of the above-discussed factors. To test whether central 
banks have stronger incentives to avoid losses when the central bank is large relative to the 
government, and hence the government is more likely to rely on the central bank profit distributions, 
we split the sample by the ratio of central bank operating expenses to total tax revenues of the 
government.20  
(Insert Figure 6 about here) 
We find that central banks with above median expense ratios (i.e., with ratios greater or equal 
to 0.1%) exhibit a larger discontinuity than central banks with below median values.21 The incidence 
of small profits is 10.36 times larger than the incidence of small losses for central banks with above 
median values, while it is only 3.76 larger for central banks with below median values. The difference 
between the two values is statistically significant at 1%.22  
Pressures arising from budgetary considerations are also larger when the central bank faces a 
more fiscally conservative leader. Small profits are 10.88 times more likely than small losses when 
the country’s leader is affiliated with a right-leaning party as opposed to only 4.77 when affiliated 
with a left-leaning party. The difference between them is statistically significant at 10%. 
The discontinuity is also significantly larger when central banks face a more extreme populist 
leader of either left or right orientation. We find that small profits are 19 times more likely than small 
losses when the country leader is affiliated with an extreme right- or left-wing party, while it is only 
                                                          
20 There is an alternative way to interpret this proxy: the metric measures the relative cost of running a central bank for 
the government if the central bank accounts were consolidated with those of the government. Failing to independently 
cover their expenses therefore puts pressure on the government’s budget, particularly when such expenses are a large 
fraction of their government’s budget. 
21 Note that mechanical relations between operating expenses and profitability push in the opposite direction (i.e., higher 
operating expenses produce lower profitability). This is not true for alternative measures such as the fraction of average 
central bank profits to government’s tax revenues as more profitable centrals banks are more likely to be in the profit 
region.  
22 We find similar results if we instead scale operating expenses with GDP (i.e., the size of the country’s economy). For 
central banks with above median values of operating expenses to GDP, the incidence of small profits is 9.88 times larger 
than the incidence of small losses as opposed to only 3.03 for central banks with below median values. The difference 
between the groups is statistically significant at 1%. Sample splits with respect to the country’s debt to GDP or 
government deficit (surplus) to GDP do not reveal any systematic differences in the size of the discontinuity.  
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4.89 times more likely when the country leader is affiliated with a centrist party.23 The difference 
between the two values is statistically significant at 5%. 
Publicly traded central banks also exhibit an economical and statistically larger discontinuity. 
However, this last result should be viewed with caution as only four central banks (Belgium, Greece, 
Japan, and Switzerland) are publicly traded, and obviously many other variables can potentially be 
used to describe the particular features of these central banks.  
Consistent with the idea that pressures from governments, politicians or the public may give 
rise to agency problems and career concerns to central bank governors, we find that the discontinuity 
is significantly (both economically and statistically) larger when central bank governors are re-
appointable. Small profits are 2.16 times more likely than small losses when central bank governors 
are not re-appointable as opposed to 7.02 times more likely when they are re-appointable; the 
difference between them is statistically significant at 1%. 
Perhaps surprisingly, central banks that enjoy less de jure independence do not exhibit larger 
discontinuities. This result highlights the distinction between de jure independence and de facto 
independence. It may also be due to the endogeneity of central bank independence: positive profits 
may help the central bank justify and maintain its independence.  
We also find no significant differences with respect to the broader quality of institutions. With 
respect to central banks, we find no significant differences in the discontinuity across central banks 
with varying levels of transparency. Central banks that are more open about their policy objectives 
and decision-making have similar discontinuities as less transparent central banks. The same holds 
for the country’s broader quality of institutions and respect for the law as captured by World Bank 
measures of government effectiveness, corruption, and rule of law. 
 
 
                                                          
23 In robustness tests, we also distinguish between extreme left and extreme right. We find that the discontinuity is present 
for both. It is slightly more pronounced for extreme right than extreme left but the difference between them is not 
significant. 
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Accounting standards, foreign assets, and exchange rates 
The ability of central banks to manage earnings and avoid reporting losses may be also 
influenced by accounting standards as well as the composition of their assets and the exchange rate 
system.24 Central banks under IFRS, for example, may have less room for discretion as IFRS does 
not allow general purpose provisions and a greater share of assets and liabilities are mark-to-market.25 
One may thus expect that central banks under IFRS have a lower ability to manage earnings and a 
smaller discontinuity.26 Central banks with large foreign assets (e.g., foreign currency reserves, gold, 
and other foreign securities) may also have lower ability to manage earnings, because foreign assets 
are reported on their balance sheet in the local currency, and changes in the exchange rate thus imply 
changes in the central bank’s asset value. The associated gains and losses in the value of foreign assets 
have to be reported in the income statement under IFRS, creating volatility in central banks’ profits. 
Hence, to the extent that central banks do not perfectly control the exchange rate, they cannot 
precisely control their profits, suggesting that central banks with large foreign assets have a smaller 
discontinuity. The opposite should hold for central banks with exchange rate pegs. 
Results in Figure 7 provide support for these hypotheses. The discontinuity is present under 
both IFRS and local accounting standards—consistent with ability to manage earnings under both 
sets of accounting standards—but it is statistically and economically smaller under IFRS.27 Central 
banks with above median foreign assets to total assets ratios have a smaller discontinuity. Central 
banks with a fixed exchange rate peg have instead a more pronounced discontinuity. Additional 
                                                          
24 As the debate about the Fed’s solvency began heating up—following the announcement of QE2—the Fed made a subtle 
change to its accounting rules making it almost impossible to ever have to report capital losses. While this change makes 
it unlikely to ever have “to go cap-in-hand” to the US Treasury for a capital top-up, protecting its independence, it may 
undermine its credibility and the credibility of the US government who provides ultimate back-up. Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch’s Ralph Axel states: “such moves do not promote confidence in the Fed, but rather cause concerns within 
markets. We will not make too much of a fuss over this accounting change, but the overall theme of reduced government 
credibility is strengthened by it… In our view the ongoing decline in credibility translates into a higher chance of a 
downgrade in the sovereign credit rating.” (“The Fed can’t go bankrupt. Anymore”, Financial Times, January 20 2011).  
25 General purpose provisions whose values are arguably subjective may afford central banks a greater ability to reduce 
volatility in reported earnings and dividends that may arise from “paper” gains and losses on revaluation of foreign assets 
and liabilities or assets and liabilities that are mark-to-market. 
26 This is not meant to say that IFRS leaves no room for discretion or that discretion under IFRS is uniform. 
27 In unreported robustness tests, we also find that central banks under IFRS exhibit a larger discontinuity when the greater 
share of total assets is measured at historical cost. 
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results reported in Figure A1 in the Appendix further suggest that the ability to control and manage 
earnings may be even more pronounced when the central bank is introducing a peg.  
(Insert Figure 7 about here) 
Is the effect mechanical, or simply due to the business model of central banks in general? 
The cross-sectional systematic differences in the magnitude and significance of the 
discontinuity are more difficult to reconcile with the notion that a profit discontinuity is simply a 
mechanical feature of central banks’ business model. However, we can also more directly test for that 
hypothesis by “switching off” the factors hypothesized to give rise to profit concerns. Under the null 
hypothesis that the discontinuity is mechanical, the discontinuity should persist no matter which 
factors are present. Under the alternative hypothesis that the discontinuity is due to frictions, the 
discontinuity should disappear when no frictions are present.  
Which minimum combination of factors (frictions) can “switch off” the effect? We find that 
there is no economically and statistically significant discontinuity when a combination of factors is 
switched off: 1) when dividend distribution rules do not impose a “hard” budget constraint and central 
bank governors are not re-appointable or 2) when central bank’s operating expenses are not a large 
fraction of the government’s tax revenues and central bank governors are not re-appointable. Figure 
8 presents results for these combinations. Overall, these findings suggest that incentives to avoid 
losses are much reduced or eliminated if the financial linkages between central banks and their 
governments do not impose significant pressures on their respective budgets and when private interest 
considerations do not make central bank governors susceptible to external pressures.28 
(Insert Figure 8 about here) 
Multivariate analysis 
Table 2 transfers the above analyses to a multivariate framework to account for correlations 
between the various factors, and to explore the marginal explanatory power of each.29 Before we start, 
                                                          
28 Weak power due to smaller samples is an alternative reason why the discontinuity may become insignificant. However, 
this explanation is less likely to be the cause for our findings, because many other combinations of factors with equally 
small samples do yield significant discontinuities.  
29 Table A2 in the appendix reports a correlation matrix. 
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we should note that the sample significantly changes with the inclusion or exclusion of particular 
factors, which makes the interpretation of this approach less straightforward than would be desirable. 
Indeed, a key reason to show the discontinuity plots before is to provide the greatest possible level of 
transparency to the reader; the regression analysis presented now should be seen as a complement. 
That said, the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained in the bivariate analysis above; we 
point out exceptions in what follows. 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Using the sub-sample of observations around the discontinuity (i.e., observations in the first 
bin to the right and to the left of zero), we examine how the incidence of small profits, as opposed to 
small losses, varies with the factors studied in Figures 5, 6 and 7. We estimate an econometric model 
where the dependent variable equals one if a central bank falls in the small profit region, [0, 0.003], 
and equals zero if it falls in the small loss region, [-0.003, 0). (109 central banks in our sample fall in 
the small profit or small loss region at least once during the sample period.) All explanatory variables 
are expressed as dummy variables using the same cut-off points as in the figures and are coded so 
that they all predict positive coefficients when associated with higher incentives to avoid losses. We 
add each variable sequentially, unless it correlates with other variables measuring a related concept. 
The model is estimated with OLS, and standard errors are clustered at the central bank account level.30  
Despite the significantly reduced sample, results in Table 2 are remarkably similar to those 
found in Figures 5, 6, and 7. We find that dividend distribution rules, political pressures, and career 
concerns of central bank governors are the three most important factors, both in terms of the size of 
their coefficient and their marginal R-square. Consistent with unconditional results, right-wing party 
affiliation and extreme party affiliation are each associated with higher probabilities of reporting 
small profits than small losses, but we do not have enough variation in this smaller sample to 
distinguish between them. Publicly traded central banks are also more likely to report small profits 
                                                          
30 We do not estimate a logit model because depending on the sample composition, some variables perfectly predict the 
outcome, which leads to their automatic exclusion from the logit model. This is a mechanical problem caused by the 
functional form of the logit and does not extend to the OLS. 
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than losses. Also similar to unconditional results, we find no significant evidence that central bank 
transparency or the overall quality of country institutions and respect for the law matter for loss 
avoidance behavior. Central bank legal independence and IFRS are not found to matter once we 
control for other factors. (This is due to the presence of other factors and not the smaller sample.)31 
Finally, in unreported robustness checks we also add the growth of GDP in the model. This leaves all 
other coefficients unchanged (both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance) and the 
coefficient of GDP itself is statistically insignificant, consistent with idea that narrow-interval 
regressions compare counties with similar business cycle conditions. 
In sum, the multivariate analysis corroborates the findings illustrated by the profit distribution 
plots.  
 
5. Is there evidence for a relationship between loss avoidance and distorted policy choices? 
To examine whether central banks’ tendency to avoid losses distorts policy choices, we 
examine both Taylor rule coefficients (as a proxy for policy inputs) and inflation rates (both in levels 
and relative to target, as a proxy for policy outputs) for central banks just to the left and just to the 
right of the zero-profit threshold. Absent a policy distortion, policy should not be significantly 
different just to the right and left of zero, because zero is not a meaningful number in a frictionless 
model of central banking. By contrast, if loss avoidance distorts policy, we should observe that in a 
regression of short-term (policy) rates on various explanatory variables, the coefficient on deviations 
of inflation from its target is systematically smaller for central banks that report small profits relative 
to central banks that report small losses.  
Similarly, if central banks’ loss avoidance matters for policy outcomes, we should observe a 
discontinuity in inflation rates at the zero-profit threshold: inflation rates (or inflation gaps, relative 
                                                          
31 For example, keeping the sample the same as in column (8) and dropping the other variables from the model, yields a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient for central bank independence equal to -0.167 (p-value = 0.087). 
Similarly, we find that including other variables into the model turns the effect of IFRS insignificant. We do not include 
exposure to foreign assets because our sample size is significantly reduced when we combine data on foreign assets with 
other determinants of loss avoidance. 
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to target) should be systematically higher for central banks that report small profits relative to central 
banks that report small losses. By contrast, under the null hypothesis, we expect a smooth distribution 
and no discontinuity in policy inputs or outputs across central banks that are just to the left or right of 
any given profit threshold, including zero.  
Lastly, note that even under our alternative hypothesis, a discontinuity should only be 
observed at zero profits; we have no reason to assume (under either the statistical null or the 
alternative hypothesis) that inflation would be a discontinuous function of central bank profits for any 
profit level other than zero. Tests for discontinuous changes of coefficients at non-zero profit levels 
thus serve as placebos. 
Inflation outcomes 
Given greater data availability and a more straightforward econometric approach, we start 
with the “policy outcomes” analysis using polynomial regressions and narrow interval regressions 
with inflation rates and inflation gaps as outcome variables. Polynomial regressions use a large 
sample from both inside and outside the small profit and small loss region. They control for a possible 
underlying relationship between inflation rates and central bank profitability using polynomials of 
profitability, along with other controls, and investigate whether the polynomial “wants” to jump 
around zero and various other (placebo) thresholds. Narrow interval regressions focus instead on the 
region around the zero (i.e., [-0.003, +0.003] in our case) and compare the inflation rates of central 
banks that are just below the zero profit-threshold to those that are just above. Formally, we estimate  
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡� + 𝛿𝛿𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠=1 , (1) 
where 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 indicates the inflation rate (or inflation gap) in country 𝑖𝑖 at year 𝑡𝑡. 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the central bank in country 𝑖𝑖 at year 𝑡𝑡 reported a profit, 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 0 at year 𝑡𝑡, and it equals 
0 otherwise. The term ∑ �𝛽𝛽𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�𝑛𝑛𝑠𝑠=1  indicates polynomials of profitability, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. We use 
a flexible functional form allowing for nonlinearities with polynomials up to order n and a different 
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functional form for profit and loss observations.32 The terms 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 indicate time-varying country 
characteristics and country-fixed effects, respectively. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the idiosyncratic error tem. A positive 
and statistically significant 𝛽𝛽 indicates that the conditional expectation of inflation rates, 𝐸𝐸(𝜋𝜋/𝑥𝑥), is 
systematically higher as one moves from just below the zero-profit threshold to just above.  
The narrow-interval regressions estimate similar specifications without the polynomials and 
using only observations around the threshold: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +  𝛿𝛿𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 (2) 
Similar to eqn. (1), a positive and statistically significant 𝛽𝛽 indicates that inflation rates are 
systematically higher as one moves from just below to just above zero.  
Table 3 reports results for polynomial regressions. In columns (1) to (5) we report results for 
eqn. (1) with inflation rate as the dependent variable. Column (1) reports results for a baseline 
specification without any controls apart from the six-order polynomials. We find a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 equal to 2.927. This indicates that there is a positive and 
significant jump in the conditional expectation of inflation rates at the zero-profit threshold: inflation 
rates are nearly 3 percentage points higher. This result seems surprisingly large at first, but is 
economically plausible considering that the sample mean and standard deviation of inflation rates are 
6.73 and 8.26, respectively.33  
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
Figure 9 offers an illustration of the same analysis, based on specification (1) of Table 3. The 
plot shows predicted inflation rates from the model for different levels of profitability. The horizontal 
axis divides 𝑥𝑥 into bins that contain a small range of 𝑥𝑥-values. The bins are constructed so that each 
bin falls on either side of the threshold (i.e., no bin contains the threshold in its interior). The vertical 
                                                          
32 There is no a priori reason to expect this relationship to be the same on both sides of threshold in general (Lee and 
Lemieux 2010) and in our context in particular. Therefore and to avoid forcing a result due to a rigid functional form 
assumption, we allow for different polynomial coefficients on both sides. 
33 Also, the magnitudes appear plausible compared to the estimates by Adler et al. (2012) on the impact of central bank 
capital levels (as opposed to marginal profit levels in our study) on monetary policy and inflation outcomes; see also 
Stella (2008), Klüh and Stella (2008) and Benecká et al. (2012) for a critical evaluation of these findings. 
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line indicates the zero-profit threshold. Each circle in the plot corresponds to the average inflation 
rate for a particular bin. The solid line indicates the average predicted values for each bin. The dashed 
lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. There is a clear and significant discontinuity in inflation 
rates at zero. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that balance sheet concerns compromise 
inflation rates, and inconsistent with the null hypothesis of a smooth relation between inflation and 
central bank profits.  
(Insert Figure 9 about here) 
As a placebo test, we examine whether inflation rates exhibit similar discontinuities at various 
ex ante not meaningful thresholds of 𝑥𝑥 such as 0.024, 0.012, 0.006, -0.006, -0.012, and -0.024. We 
find no evidence of a discontinuity in any of these cases; Figure 10 illustrates results for two of these 
thresholds, 0.012 and -0.012.  
(Insert Figure 10 about here) 
Subsequent specifications in Table 3 present similar specifications to column (1) with 
additional controls. In column (2), we additionally control for broad economic conditions that may 
correlate with both inflation rates and central bank profitability such as GDP growth, income levels, 
and rule of law. Rule of law has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, indicating that 
countries with higher respect for the law have on average lower inflation rates. In column (3) and (4), 
we additionally control for factors that drive central banks incentives to avoid losses that may also 
correlate with inflation rates directly. This includes political party affiliation, whether the central bank 
governor is re-appointable, and central bank independence.  
We find a more pronounced discontinuity when we add these controls, indicating that omitted 
variable bias may have attenuated, rather than upward-biased the coefficient in column (1). For 
example, controlling for broad economic conditions in column (2) increases the estimated coefficient 
from 2.927 to 3.787. This is not surprising, given that better economic conditions correlate negatively 
with both inflation rates and central bank profitability (i.e., richer countries tend to have lower 
inflation and their central banks are less likely to report losses). Controlling for factors that may 
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influence central bank policies has a similar effect, raising the profit coefficient from 3.787 to 4.595 
and 4.881 as they tend of be associated with lower inflation rates.34 In column (5), we also introduce 
country fixed effects, thus retaining only countries with significant within-variation of both profits 
and inflation. Doing so helps control for a broader set of time-invariant country and central bank 
characteristics that our controls up to column (4) may fail to capture. We find again a positive and 
statistically coefficient for 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 of similar magnitude. In unreported robustness checks, we also 
confirm the jump in both high- and low-income countries. The estimated coefficient is larger in low-
income countries (4.303 as opposed to 2.452 for high-income countries).35  
Column (6) presents a similar specification using inflation gap (inflation minus the inflation 
target) as the dependent variable, estimated for central banks with explicit inflation targets. Results 
are similar to those reported earlier for inflation rates: central banks with small positive profits have 
systematically larger inflation gaps than central banks with small losses by around 2 percentage point. 
This finding may suggest that central banks with greater incentives to avoid losses adjust their policy 
rates less aggressively to inflation gaps. We will test this hypothesis shortly with regressions 
approximating a Taylor rule.  
It is important to ensure that the particular functional form chosen for the polynomials does 
not drive the results above. Aside from ensuring robustness to different orders of polynomials, we 
therefore also report results for narrow interval regressions in Table 4. Identification in this case is 
obtained using only observations of central banks with very similar levels of profitability, with ROA 
ranging between -0.003 and 0.003. Results are similar to those reported in Table 3, with the estimated 
size of the discontinuity ranging between 1.357 and 3.590. Our most conservative specification with 
country fixed effects and time-varying controls points to an estimated jump of 2.245. Identification 
in this case is obtained by comparing the inflation rates in the same country when the central bank’s 
                                                          
34 To be able to compare our estimates, we keep our sample constant across the various specifications using for all 
specifications the sub-sample of observations for which all control variables up to column (3) are available. 
35 In our sample, the average inflation rate for low income countries is 8.660 with a standard deviation of 10.306. The 
corresponding figures for high income countries are 2.748 and 2.528, respectively.  
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ROA is just below or just above zero. Results using deviations from inflation targets are also 
qualitatively similar. 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
We conclude that there indeed exists an association between a propensity to avoid losses and 
inflation outcomes. In what follows, we provide suggestive evidence supporting the idea that a more 
accommodative policy stance on monetary policy is partially responsible for these results. 
Policy inputs (Taylor rule regressions) 
The most consequential question that our results thus far raise is whether central banks’ 
propensity to avoid losses impacts monetary policy choices. Needless to say, policy rules and their 
parameters are impossible to observe and difficult to infer. To nevertheless try and approach this 
question, we study whether the responsiveness of short-term nominal interest rates to changes in 
inflation gaps and the output gap is associated with being in the small-profit region as opposed to the 
small-loss region of the profit distribution. 
Specifically, a Taylor rule assumes that a central bank’s policy instrument—the short-term 
nominal interest rate—responds to deviations of inflation and output fundamentals from targets. Since 
its inception in the early 1990s, estimation techniques have undergone various modifications. 
Although many issues remain unresolved and the literature has yet to settle on an empirical 
benchmark, the following is a popular specification: 
𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋(𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗) + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦(𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,  (3) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡 denotes the short-term nominal interest rate at time 𝑡𝑡, (𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗) denotes the “inflation 
gap” as the difference between the actual inflation rate, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡−1, and the desired level, 𝜋𝜋𝑡𝑡∗, (𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−1∗ ) 
denotes the output gap as the difference between the actual output and its long-term equilibrium level, 
known as potential output. Lagged inflation and output values are motivated by the lack of 
contemporaneous data on inflation and output gap when the central bank sets the interest rate 
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(McCallum 1999).36 The inclusion of the lagged short-term interest rates among the fundamentals 
accounts for policy responses to other factors such as interest rate smoothing (Clarida et al. 2000) and 
serially correlated policy shocks (Rudebusch 2002).37 Simulations in Carare and Tchaidze (2005) 
show that Taylor rules with lagged interest rates among the explanatory variables yield small biases 
in estimates of the inflation and output coefficients (𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋 and 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦) when the timing of fundamentals is 
misspecified.38  
The coefficient 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋 measures how strongly the central bank responds to changes in deviations 
of inflation from its target. We are interested in whether 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋 is systematically and discontinuously 
different for central banks that report small profits versus small losses. (Short-term rates may correlate 
with profit levels for various reasons, but we are not aware of a theoretical reason why short-term 
rates would discontinuously change as a function of central bank profits, other than because short-
term rates and profits are co-determined by policy and are a function of the various factors we have 
shown to correlate with the discontinuity in profits.) Notwithstanding the conceptual and practical 
difficulties of such reduced-form parametrizations of policy functions,39 we estimate an augmented 
version of eqn. (3) around the discontinuity, allowing for interactions of inflation gaps with the profit 
indicator, 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡: 
𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋1�𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ � + 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋2�𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ � ∗ 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝑦𝑦�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ � + 𝛾𝛾𝑠𝑠𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, (4) 
and test whether the 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋2  interaction coefficient is significantly different from zero. The null 
hypothesis is that whether the central bank makes a small profit or a small loss is irrelevant for its 
policy, so 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋2 should be indistinguishable from zero. The alternative hypothesis is that small profits 
are, at least in part, due to manipulations of the policy rate, as suggested by theory (e.g., Berriel and 
                                                          
36 Lagged-based rules are not necessarily backward looking as lags serve as predictors of future values (see Tchaidze 
2004). 
37 Reasons mentioned in the literature behind interest rate smoothing include model uncertainty, the fear of disrupting 
capital markets, loss of credibility from sudden large policy reversals, need for consensus building for a policy change. 
Serially correlated policy shocks account for policy responses to serially correlated disturbances not captured by inflation 
and output gap. These may include credit crunches, oil and commodity price shocks, exchange rate movements, and stock 
market developments. These could also represent measurement errors between what policymakers thought about the state 
of the economy in real-time and what they know ex-post. Such errors could arise because changes in productivity trends. 
38 As shown in Orphanides (2001) misspecifying the timing of the fundamentals may bias the estimated coefficients. 
39 See http://johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2014/06/taylor-rules.html for a discussion. 
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Bhattarai 2009). Under that hypothesis, one would expect a negative 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋2  coefficient, indicating a more 
lenient or less aggressive monetary policy. Given the probable role of exchange rates in emerging 
economies’ interest rate setting, we also estimate augmented specifications of eqn. (4), where we add 
the changes in the exchange rate, ∆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, among the explanatory variables. 
Table 5 presents our findings. In column (1) we present results for a full set of countries, 
assuming that inflation targets are 2% and 4.5% for high and low income countries, respectively. In 
column (3) we present results for a smaller sample of countries with explicit inflation targets from 
Siklos (2017). Columns (2) and (4) present corresponding specifications after including changes in 
the currency exchange rate among the explanatory variables. Measures of the output gap are obtained 
using the Hondrik-Prescott (HP) filter. We estimate the model in the [-0.003, 0.003] region using the 
Arellano-Bond estimator, which controls for country-fixed effects, and robust standard errors.40  
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
In column (1), we find that central banks in the small loss region have positive and statistically 
significant inflation coefficient of 0.466, similar to what is found in the literature.41 However, the 
interaction coefficient is significantly negative and of a similar magnitude. As a result, central banks 
in the small profit region have an inflation coefficient (𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋1 plus 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋2) that is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that central banks with 
balance sheet concerns are less likely to aggressively raise interest rates as inflation increases. Similar 
results are obtained in column (2) when we also include the change in the exchange rate among the 
explanatory variables. Results in columns (3) and (4) for inflation targeting countries, are qualitatively 
similar, though the 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋1 coefficient seems to lack power due to the small sample used to estimate these 
                                                          
40 The Arellano-Bond estimator offers a number of advantages in estimating Taylor rules because it controls for the 
endogeneity of regressors using lagged realizations of regressors as instruments. Furthermore, it controls for time-
invariant unobservable country characteristics, and mitigates the autocorrelation due to the lead-lag structure of the 
equation. Previous studies that use a GMM estimator for Taylor rules include Clarida et al. (2000) and Jondeau et al. 
(2004). 
41 Clarida et al. (2000), Orphanides (2001), and Orphanides and Williams (2002) report inflation coefficients of 0.45, 
0.56, and 0.35, respectively. See Carare and Tchaidze (2005) for a review. 
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specifications. In unreported robustness tests, we also confirm that results are qualitatively similar for 
both high and low-income countries.42  
In sum, subject to the limitations inherent to the methodologies we employ, the data appears 
consistent with the hypothesis that central bank’s policies and profits are co-determined and affected 
by various political and agency frictions. That data is inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
profitability considerations are entirely irrelevant to central banks’ behavior. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides a set of novel empirical facts that informs the premise of a theoretical 
debate on central bank design and monetary policy. In particular, we devise a test of whether central 
banks care about the sign of their profits. Specifically, the key idea is that a discontinuity in the profit 
distribution appears to be a necessary consequence of central banks being concerned with the sign of 
their profits.  
We document the presence of such a discontinuity, as well as various factors that drive its 
significance and magnitude. We find that measures of political and market pressure, central bankers’ 
career concerns, and the ability to precisely control profits are significant predictors of small profits 
versus losses. Small positive profits are also correlated with smaller Taylor rule coefficients and 
higher inflation levels and inflation gaps. These findings suggest that a preference for positive profits 
is a friction that may be important for future theoretical modeling to consider. 
If one interpreted the facts we provide literally within the framework of existing models, one 
might conclude that risks to monetary stability may be greater than is often assumed due to the 
existence of various factors that appear to be linked to central bank profit concerns. An extreme 
interpretation would be that especially amid large-scale asset repurchases and increased political 
                                                          
42 Re-estimating column (4) separately for high and low income countries yields point estimates 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋1  and 𝛾𝛾𝜋𝜋2  equal to 
0.193 and -0.309 for low income countries and 0.212 and -0.512 for high income countries. Similar results are also 
obtained if we drop observations with low or negative inflation rates (below 0.5 percent). 
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pressure,43 the risks to runaway inflation may be more pronounced than generally assumed, even in 
the United States.  
This interpretation should be put in some perspective, however. Many central banks (such as 
the Bank of Japan) have long conducted monetary policy with large-scale asset purchases, and the 
apparent risks to monetary stability have not materialized (at least so far). Similarly, the central banks 
of Chile, Israel, and Slovakia have successfully operated with negative equity for a sustained period 
of time.  
To some, these data points are more difficult to reconcile with the notion that balance sheet 
considerations are likely to lead to monetary instability, because more specifically, negative equity 
does not seem to jeopardize a central bank’s independence. However, also this perspective benefits 
from nuance. Indeed, the opposite argument can be made. Suppose that the level of the central bank’s 
equity is deeply negative and that the payout rule is such that profits must not be distributed to the 
Treasury until all past cumulative losses are replenished. In such cases, it is virtually impossible for 
the Treasury to receive dividends from a central bank with deeply negative equity in the foreseeable 
future, no matter the realization of period-profits. The impossibility to pay dividends effectively 
isolates the central bank from political pressure in such a situation.44 
These considerations illustrate that the facts we present about central banks’ profit concerns 
are in important respects different from concerns about negative equity positions. Profit concerns may 
exist simply for political or “behavioral” reasons, such as the difficulty of communicating losses to 
the public and other constituents. Moreover, many central banks seeem to be exposed to sufficient 
political pressure, career concerns, and an institutional ability such that incentives for profit 
considerations enter decision-making. De jure independence and a buffer account do not seem to be 
sufficient to entirely shield central bankers from these pressures.  
                                                          
43 See Fortune, “Read the Full Cease-and-Desist Letter a Senior Congressman Just Sent to Janet Yellen”, February 3 2017, 
for recent developments in the US. 
44 This insight is due to Luboš Pástor, to whom we are grateful for mentioning it to us. 
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One might conclude that accounting rules that allow central banks to avoid disclosing losses 
enables them to steer clear of the political pressures that may otherwise influence their decision-
making. However, this notion would assume that only the sign but not the level of profits (and the 
associated dividend) matters to decision makers. Whether this assumption is warranted depends on 
the external validity of our estimates, which are obtained from the margin around zero profit levels. 
Such a claim to external validity is difficult to substantiate in our setting. We thus leave this question 
to future research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable name Definitions and data sources 
ROA Net income of a central bank divided by its average total assets. The data 
is from Bankscope. 
 
Profit 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 An indicator variable that equals 1 if ROA of central bank i in year t ≥ 0, 
and 0 otherwise. 
 
“Hard” budget constraint An indicator variable that equals 1 if the central bank dividend payout 
ratio (dividends divided by net income) is greter tha 90% (third tertile of 
the entral bank dividend payout distribution) or when a central bank pays 
dividends despite incurring a loss. The indicator vaible equals 0 if the 
central banlk dividend payout ratio is less than 50% (first tertile of the 
central bank divididend payout distrribution) or when a central banks 
receives dividends from the government. The data is from Bankscope. 
 
Operating expenses The ratio of central bank personnel expenses from Bankscope to the 
country’s total tax revenues from World Bank. 
 
Right-wing party 
affiliation 
An indicator that equals 1 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with 
the right-leaning party (conservative, Christian democratic, or right-
wing), and 0 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with the left-
leaning party (communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing). The 
data is from Beck et al. (2001) and is available for years 1992-2012. 
 
Right-leaning party 
affiliation 
An indicator that equals 1 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with 
the right-leaning party (conservative, Christian democratic, or right-
wing), and 0 otherwise. The data is from Beck et al. (2001) and is 
available for years 1992-2012. 
 
Left-leaning party 
affiliation 
An indicator that equals 1 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with 
the left-leaning party (communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-
wing), and 0 otherwise. The data is from Beck et al. (2001) and is 
available for years 1992-2012. 
 
Extreme party affiliation An indicator variable that equals 1 if a country’s chief executive has 
affiliation with the nationalist party, and 0 otherwise. The data is from 
Beck et al. (2001) and is available for years 1992-2012. 
 
Publicly traded central 
banks 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the shares of a central bank are 
quoted on a public exchange, and 0 otherwise. The data is from 
Bankscope. 
 
Governor re-appointable An indicator variable that equals 1 if a central bank governor is re-
appointable, and 0 otherwise. The country is deemed to allow the 
reappointment of a central bank governor if at least one central bank 
governor served more than one legal term during the sample period. The 
data on central bank governors’ time in office is from Dreher et al. (2008).  
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Central bank legal 
independence 
An index of central bank independence (CBIW) based on Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2014). The index scores answers to 24 questions covering 
different aspects of central bank legal independence (incl. policy choice, 
objectives, and governance structures). The index has a theoretical range 
from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating more independent central banks. 
The index is available for years 1998 to 2010. We use the value of the 
index in 1998 for the time period between 1998 and 2010. We assign 
values of the index from 2010 for years 2011-2014. All central banks in 
Euro Zone countries receive the same score. 
 
Central bank 
transparency 
An index of central bank policy transparency based on Dincer and 
Eichengreen (2014). The index scores answers to 15 questions covering 
different aspects of the transparency of central bank operations (incl. 
openness about policy objectives, economic inputs used for policy 
decisions, and decision making). The index has a theoretical range from 
0 to 15 with higher values indicating more independent central banks. The 
index is available for years 1998 to 2010. We use the value of the index 
in 1998 for the time period between 1998 and 2010. We assign values of 
the index from 2010 for years 2011-2014.  
 
Rule of law  Rule of law captures the extent to which economic agents have trust in 
and abide by legal institutions, such as contract enforcement, property 
rights, and the courts. The index is expressed in standard normal units, 
ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values indicate greater 
rule of law. We use the world-average value (index = 0) for our sample 
splits. The data is from Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann 
et al. 2010).  
 
Government 
effectiveness 
The government effectiveness index captures the quality of public 
services and the degree of its independence from political influence. The 
index is expressed in standard normal units, ranging from approximately 
-2.5 to 2.5. Higher values indicate greater government effectiveness. We 
use the world-average value (index = 0) for our sample splits. The data is 
from Worldwide Governance Indicators (see Kaufmann et al. 2010).  
 
Control of corruption Control of corruption captures perceptions of the use of power by political 
elites for private gain. The index is expressed in standard normal units, 
ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. Higher values indicate greater 
control of corruption. We use the world-average value (index = 0) for our 
sample splits. The data is from Worldwide Governance Indicators (see 
Kaufmann et al. 2010).  
 
Do not follow IFRS An indicator variable that equals 1 if a central bank prepares financial 
statements in accordance with local standards, and 0 if it follows IFRS. 
The data is from Bankscope.  
 
Exchange rate peg  An indicator variable that equals 1 if a country has an exchange rate peg 
based on classification of Klein and Shambaugh (2008), and 0 otherwise. 
The data is from Klein and Shambaugh (2008) and is available for all the 
years in our sample period. 
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Introduce exchange rate 
peg  
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a country introduces an exchange 
rate peg in a given year based on classification of Klein and Shambaugh 
(2008), and 0 otherwise. The data is from Klein and Shambaugh (2008). 
 
Abandon exchange rate 
peg  
An indicator variable that equals 1 if a country abandons an exchange rate 
peg in a given year based on classification of Klein and Shambaugh 
(2008), and 0 otherwise. The data is from Klein and Shambaugh (2008). 
 
Foreign assets The ratio of central bank foreign assets to total assets. The data on central 
bank foreign assets is from IMF. 
 
Inflation The country rate of consumer price inflation in a given year. The data is 
from World Bank. 
 
Growth rate of nominal 
GDP 
The percentage change in nominal GDP based on the data from World 
Bank. 
 
Low income countries An indicator variable that equals 1 if a country is a low-income economy 
in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Low income economies are defined 
based on GNI per capita threshold of less than $12,475 (see World Bank). 
  
Interest rate 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 or 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 The short-term treasury bill interest rate in country i and year t or t-1. The 
data is from International Financial Statistics (IFS), IMF. 
 
(Inflation – target)  
�𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ � The country rate of consumer price inflation of country i in year t-1 less the central bank target inflation in year t. The data on inflation rates is 
from World Bank, the data on inflation targets is from Siklos (2017). The 
median inflation target for low (4.5%) or high (2%) income economies is 
used when a central bank does not use an explicit inflation target. 
 
Output gap 
�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ � The difference between the actual GDP and the expected GDP for country i and year t-1. The expected GDP is the smoothed value of GDP in a given 
year obtained using the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter and the 
timeseries of available GDP data for country i during our sample period. 
 
Δ Exchange rate 
∆𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 The difference in the exchange rate of local currency to USD from t-1 to t for country i. The data is form Bankscope. 
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Table A2: Correlation between the test variables 
 
The table reports Pearson correlation coefficients for the variables used in Table 2. The p-values are reported 
below the correlation coefficients. All variables are expressed as dummy variables using the same cut-off points 
as in Figure 6. “Hard” budget constraint is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the central bank dividend payout 
ratio (dividends divided by net income) is greter than 90% (third tertile of the entral bank dividend payout 
distribution) or when a central bank pays dividends despite incurring a loss. The indicator vaible equals 0 if the 
central banlk dividend payout ratio is less than 50% (first tertile of the central bank divididend payout 
distrribution) or when a central banks receives dividends from the government. Operating expenses is the ratio of 
central bank personnel expenses to the country’s total tax revenues. Right-wing party affiliation is an indicator 
that equals 1 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with the right-leaning party (conservative, Christian 
democratic, or right-wing), and 0 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with the left-leaning party 
(communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing). Extreme party affiliation is an indicator variable that 
equals 1 if a country’s chief executive has affiliation with the nationalist party, and 0 otherwise. Publicly traded 
central banks is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the shares of a central bank are quoted on a public exchange, 
and 0 otherwise. Governor re-appointable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a central bank governor is re-
appointable, and 0 otherwise. Central bank legal independence is an index of central bank independence. Central 
bank policy transparency is an index of central bank policy transparency. Rule of law captures the extent to which 
economic agents have trust in and abide by legal institutions. Government effectiveness is the government 
effectiveness index. Control of corruption captures perceptions of the use of power by political elites for private 
gain. IFRS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a central bank prepares financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS, and 0 otherwise. Exchange rate peg is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a country has an exchange rate 
peg, and 0 otherwise.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
(1) "Hard" budget constraint 1.000
(2) High operating expenses -0.092 1.000
0.395
(3) Right-wing party affiliation -0.060 0.133 1.000
0.541 0.128
(4) Extreme party affiliation 0.096 0.020 -0.010 1.000
0.241 0.776 0.882
(5) Publicly traded central banks 0.205 0.048 0.111 0.073 1.000
0.007 0.494 0.099 0.172
(6) Governor re-appointable -0.034 0.017 0.103 0.110 0.097 1.000
0.665 0.812 0.132 0.044 0.057
(7) Low central bank legal independence 0.114 -0.496 -0.260 0.025 -0.068 0.159 1.000
0.161 0.000 0.000 0.676 0.224 0.004
(8) Low central bank transparency -0.004 -0.162 -0.111 0.099 -0.236 0.096 0.388 1.000
0.959 0.025 0.120 0.083 0.000 0.073 0.000
(9) Low rule of law -0.348 -0.283 -0.179 0.111 -0.190 -0.006 0.128 0.572 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.008 0.038 0.000 0.907 0.021 0.000
(10) Low government effectiveness -0.371 -0.272 -0.166 0.014 -0.140 -0.005 0.169 0.512 0.808 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.014 0.790 0.005 0.929 0.002 0.000 0.000
(11) Low control of corruption -0.396 -0.339 -0.138 0.067 -0.180 -0.036 0.049 0.527 0.836 0.816 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.040 0.207 0.000 0.474 0.375 0.000 0.000 0.000
(12) Do not follow IFRS -0.117 -0.189 -0.065 0.033 -0.131 0.123 0.352 0.281 0.092 0.086 0.131 1.000
0.126 0.007 0.334 0.536 0.007 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.063 0.082 0.007
(13) Exchange rate peg 0.155 0.665 0.106 0.082 -0.027 0.170 -0.208 0.080 -0.111 -0.171 -0.197 -0.034 1.000
0.044 0.000 0.116 0.128 0.592 0.001 0.000 0.140 0.027 0.001 0.000 0.498
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Figure A1: Distribution of central bank profits and exchange rate peg 
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits for countries with different exchange rate 
regulations. The classification of countries based on the exchange rate peg is from Klein and Shambaugh 
(2008). ROA is defined as central bank net income divided by average total assets. The distribution of ROA 
in both graphs is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The dotted vertical line shows when ROA equals zero. The number 
of observations falling into each bin is reported on the vertical axis. The McCrary test, reported in the upper 
left corner of each histogram, examines whether the discontinuity at zero is significant. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of central bank profits and McCrary (2008) test for discontinuity at zero 
 
I. Distribution of central bank profits 
  
II. McCrary (2008) test for the discontinuity at zero 
  
 
Notes: This figure plots the distribution of central bank profits over years 1992-2014 (N = 2,591). ROA is 
defined as central bank net income divided by average total assets. The distribution of ROA in both graphs 
is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The upper graph reports the histogram of ROA. The dotted vertical line shows 
when ROA equals zero. The number of observations falling into each bin is reported on the vertical axis. 
The lower graph shows the estimated density function around the zero profit threshold and its upper and 
lower confidence intervals. The McCrary test, reported in the upper left corner, examines whether the 
discontinuity at zero is significant.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of central bank profits for each of the three decades in the sample 
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits for 3 sub-periods: 1992-1999, 2000-2010 and 
2010-2014. ROA is defined as central bank net income divided by average total assets. The distribution of 
ROA in both graphs is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The dotted vertical line shows when ROA equals zero. The 
number of observations falling into each bin is reported on the vertical axis. The McCrary test, reported in the 
upper left corner of each histogram, examines whether the discontinuity at zero is significant.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of central bank profits in high vs. low income countries 
 
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits for high-income and low-income economies. The 
low-income economies have GNI per capita based on the World Bank cut-off point of less than $12,475. High-
income economies have GNI per capita that exceeds $12,475. ROA is defined as central bank net income 
divided by average total assets. The distribution of ROA in both graphs is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The dotted 
vertical line shows when ROA equals zero. The number of observations falling into each bin is reported on the 
vertical axis. The McCrary test, reported in the upper left corner of each histogram, examines whether the 
discontinuity at zero is significant.  
I. High income countries
II. Low income countries
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Figure 4: Distribution of central bank profits for central banks that can incur losses 
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits for central banks that report a loss at least once 
during the sample period and for which we have at least 10 observations. ROA is defined as central bank net 
income divided by average total assets. The distribution of ROA in both graphs is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. 
The dotted vertical line shows when ROA equals zero. The number of observations falling into each bin is 
reported on the vertical axis. The McCrary test, reported in the upper left corner of each histogram, examines 
whether the discontinuity at zero is significant. 
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Figure 5: Distribution of central bank profits and dividends to government 
I. Dividend distribution rules 
“Soft” budget constraint    “Hard” budget constraint 
 
II. Dividend payments – high vs. low split 
Payout < 90%      Payout ≥ 90% 
 
 
 
Contingency tables
“Soft” 
budget 
constraint
“Hard” 
budget 
constraint Total
Small profit 45 18 63
Small loss 22 0 22 χ2-test 7.97
Total 67 18 85 p = 0.005
Small profit/small loss 2.05 infinity
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Contingency tables
Payout      
< 50%
Payout        
> 90% Total
Small profit 162 69 231
Small loss 37 8 45 χ2-test 2.74
Total 199 77 276 p = 0.098
Small profit/small loss 4.38 8.63
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III. Dividend payment – tertile split 
Payout < 50%      Payout ≥ 90% 
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits (ROA) for sample splits based on prevailing 
incentives for loss avoidance. The distribution of ROA is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The dotted vertical line 
shows when ROA equals zero. The number of observations falling into each bin is reported on the vertical 
axis. The McCrary test, reported in the upper left corner of each histogram, examines whether the discontinuity 
at zero is significant. The table below each set of histograms reports the number of observations falling into 
small profit or small loss region in the adjacent histograms (i.e. central bank profitability ROA is [0; 0.003) or 
[-0.003; 0), respectively). The χ2-test shows whether the number of small profits relative to the number of small 
losses is different in two adjacent histograms. The assignment into “hard” and “soft” budget coinstraints is 
based on the classification of central bank dividend rules for 30 countries in Archer and Moser-Boehm (2013, 
Annex 2). “Soft” budget constraint central banks can draw on external resources to cover losses or if they are 
allowed to reduce dividend payments to cover future or past losses (Chile, Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, 
India, Israel, Germany, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, 
Singapore, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, and US) . “Hard” budget constraints face 
central banks that are either substantially limited in the amount of profits they can retain or their dividend 
distribution decisions are taken jointly with the government (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom). The sample splits focussing on dividend payments split the sample based 
on central bank’s dividend payout ratio. The third tertile of the dividend payout ratio is 90%. The central banks 
that pay dividends in the presence of losses have high payout ratios. Central banks that receive dividends from 
the government (i.e. report negative dividends) have low payout ratios.   
Contingency tables
Payout      
< 50%
Payout        
> 90% Total
Small profit 69 69 138
Small loss 26 8 34 χ2-test 7.73
Total 95 77 172 p = 0.005
Small profit/small loss 2.65 8.63
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Figure 6: Distribution of central bank profits and other political, behavioral, or economic frictions 
 
I. Central bank operating expenses to total government income from taxes 
Below median      Above median 
 
 
II. Country leader affiliated with left vs. right-wing parties 
Left-wing parties    Right-wing parties 
 
  
Below 
median
Above 
median Total
Small profit 64 114 178
Small loss 17 11 28 χ2-test 6.22
Total 81 125 206 p = 0.013
Small profit/small loss 3.76 10.36
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Left-wing 
parties
Right-wing 
parties Total
Small profit 105 87 192
Small loss 22 8 30 χ2-test 3.68
Total 127 95 222 p = 0.055
Small profit/small loss 4.77 10.88
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III. Country leader affiliated with extreme (left- or right-wing) parties vs. centrist parties 
Centrist parties     Extreme parties 
 
 
IV. Central bank is publicly traded vs. not 
Not publicly traded       Publicly traded 
 
  
Centrist 
parties
Nationalist 
parties Total
Small profit 259 38 297
Small loss 53 2 55 χ2-test 3.86
Total 312 40 352 p = 0.049
Small profit/small loss 4.89 19.00
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Non-publicly 
quoted
Publicly 
quoted Total
Small profit 335 19 354
Small loss 67 0 67 χ2-test 3.77
Total 402 19 421 p = 0.052
Small profit/small loss 5.00 infinity
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V. Central bank governor re-appointable vs. not  
Not re-appointable     Re-appointable  
 
 
VI. Central bank legal independence 
Above median     Below median 
 
  
Not re-
appointable
Re-
appointable Total
Small profit 41 288 329
Small loss 19 41 60 χ2-test 14.35
Total 60 329 389 p < 0.001
Small profit/small loss 2.16 7.02
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Above 
median
Below 
median Total
Small profit 157 118 275
Small loss 22 29 51 χ2-test 3.38
Total 179 147 326 p = 0.066
Small profit/small loss 7.14 4.07
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VII. Central bank policy transparency 
Above median     Below median 
 
 
VIII. Country institutions – rule of law 
Above median     Below median 
 
  
Above 
median
Below 
median Total
Small profit 151 156 307
Small loss 29 23 52 χ2-test 0.77
Total 180 179 359 p = 0.380
Small profit/small loss 5.21 6.78
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Above 
median
Below 
median Total
Small profit 210 140 350
Small loss 39 28 67 χ2-test 0.08
Total 249 168 417 p = 0.784
Small profit/small loss 5.38 5.00
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t-stat = 10.96 t-stat = 8.86 
t-stat = 9.17 t-stat = 10.28 
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IX. Country institutions – government effectiveness 
Above median     Below median 
 
X. Country institutions – corruption 
Below median     Above Median 
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits (ROA) for sample splits based on prevailing 
incentives for loss avoidance. The variables that are used to split the sample based on prevailing incentives are 
described in Table A1 of the Appendix. The distribution of ROA is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The dotted vertical 
line shows when ROA equals zero. The number of observations falling into each bin is reported on the vertical 
axis. The McCrary test, reported in the upper left corner of each histogram, examines whether the discontinuity 
at zero is significant. The McCrary test in panel IV (histogram on the right) is not available because there are 
no loss observations that are close to zero profit threshold. (The confidence interval of the estimated density 
to the right of zero can be estimated and is consistent with the existence of the discontinuity at zero.) The table 
Above 
median
Below 
median Total
Small profit 198 146 344
Small loss 38 29 67 χ2-test 0.02
Total 236 175 411 p = 0.899
Small profit/small loss 5.21 5.03
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Above 
median
Below 
median Total
Small profit 159 185 344
Small loss 36 31 67 χ2-test 1.27
Total 195 216 411 p = 0.260
Small profit/small loss 4.42 5.97
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t-stat = 10.68 t-stat = 9.24 
t-stat = 10.86 
 
t-stat = 8.89 
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below each set of histograms reports the number of observations falling into small profit or small loss region 
in the adjacent histograms (i.e. central bank profitability ROA is [0; 0.003) or [-0.003; 0), respectively). The 
χ2-test shows whether the number of small profits relative to the number of small losses is different in two 
adjacent histograms.  
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Figure 7: Distribution of central bank profits and ability to avoid losses 
 
I. Accounting standards 
IFRS     Local standards 
 
 
 
II. Central bank foreign assets to total assets ratio 
Above median     Below median 
 
 
 
 
 
IAS/IFRS
Local 
standards Total
Small profit 86 268 354
Small loss 26 41 67 χ2-test 6.08
Total 112 309 421 p = 0.014
Small profit/small loss 3.31 6.54
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Above 
median
Below 
median Total
Small profit 45 67 112
Small loss 21 13 34 χ2-test 4.91
Total 66 80 146 p = 0.027
Small profit/small loss 2.14 5.15
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t-stat = 4.78 t-stat = 6.13 
t-stat = 7.00 t-stat = 12.80 
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III. Exchange rate regime 
Floating exchange rate    Exchange rate peg 
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits (ROA) for sample splits based on ability to avoid 
losses. The variables that are used to split the sample based on prevailing incentives are described in Table A1 
of the Appendix. The distribution of ROA is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The dotted vertical line shows when 
ROA equals zero. The number of observations falling into each bin is reported on the vertical axis. The 
McCrary test, reported in the upper left corner of each histogram, examines whether the discontinuity at zero 
is significant. The table below each set of histograms reports the number of observations falling into small 
profit or small loss region in the adjacent histograms (i.e. central bank profitability ROA is [0; 0.003) or [-
0.003; 0), respectively). The χ2-test shows whether the number of small profits relative to the number of small 
losses is different in two adjacent histograms. 
  
Floating 
rate
Exchange 
rate peg Total
Small profit 147 189 336
Small loss 40 25 65 χ2-test 6.93
Total 187 214 401 p = 0.009
Small profit/small loss 3.68 7.56
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Figure 8: Minimum combination of factors that can “switch off” the effect 
I. Dividend distribution allows contemporaneous or intertemporal smoothing 
Central bank governor not re-appointable 
 
II. Central bank operating expenses to total government income from taxes 
Central bank governor not re-appointable  
 
Notes: This figure plots the histogram of central bank profits (ROA) based on the combination of factors 
reported in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The first plot uses the intersection of sub-samples used in Figure 5.III (left 
histogram) and Figure 6.V (left histogram). The second plot uses the intersection of sub-samples used in Figure 
6.I (left histogram) and Figure 6.V (left histogram). The distribution of ROA is trimmed at [-0.09; 0.09]. The 
dotted vertical line shows when ROA equals zero. The number of observations falling into each bin is reported 
on the vertical axis. The McCrary test, reported in the upper left corner of each histogram, examines whether 
the discontinuity at zero is significant.  
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Figure 9: Predicted inflation rates from polynomial regression 
 
The figure plots predicted inflation rates from the polynomial regression reported in column (1) of Table 3. 
The vertical axis shows inflation rates. The horizontal axis shows the intervals of the ROA distribution. The 
first interval to the right of zero (1) denotes the ROA interval [0; 0.003). The first interval to the left of zero 
denotes the ROA interval [-0.003; 0). The dots show the mean inflation rates. The solid line shows the mean 
predicted inflation rates, and the dotted lines show the 95% confidence interval for predicted values.  
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Figure 10: Predicted inflation rates from polynomial regression at placebo thresholds 
The figures plot predicted inflation rates from the polynomial regression similar to the one reported in column (1) 
of Table 3. The vertical axis shows inflation rates. The horizontal axis shows the intervals of the ROA distribution. 
The vertical line in the middle of each plot shows the ROA threshold (left plot ROA threshold = –0.012; right plot 
ROA threshold = 0.012). The first interval to the right of zero (1) denotes the ROA interval that is shifted by 0.003 
relative to the threshold. The first interval to the left of zero denotes the ROA interval that is shifted by –0.003 
relative to the threshold. The dots show the mean inflation rates. The solid line shows the mean predicted inflation 
rates, and the dotted lines show the 95% confidence interval for predicted values.  
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Table 1: Sample composition by country
 
Country/Region First Obs. Country/Region First Obs. Country/Region First Obs.
Afghanistan 2011 4 Guinea 1996 5 Pakistan 1995 21
Albania 1998 17 Guyana 1995 20 Palestine 2007 7
Angola 1996 14 Haiti 1998 12 Paraguay 2003 6
Argentina 1998 16 Honduras 2006 3 Peru 1994 21
Armenia 1995 18 Hong Kong 1999 28 Philippines 1996 21
Aruba 1994 21 Hungary 1995 20 Poland 1994 21
Australia 1995 21 Iceland 1995 20 Portugal 1993 22
Austria 1993 22 India 1994 22 Qatar 2002 3
Azerbaijan 2001 14 Indonesia 1996 19 Romania 1995 24
Bahamas 1994 21 Iran 1993 12 Russia 1996 20
Bahrain 1994 18 Iraq 2011 4 Rwanda 2002 14
Bangladesh 2000 21 Ireland 1993 22 Saint Kitts & Nevis 1992 24
Barbados 1993 21 Israel 1994 21 Samoa 2001 10
Belarus 1997 17 Italy 1994 21 San Marino 1995 20
Belgium 1994 21 Jamaica 1993 22 Saudi Arabia 1998 16
Belize 1994 21 Japan 1993 23 Senegal 2006 1
Bermuda 1993 22 Jordan 1994 21 Serbia 2001 14
Bhutan 2007 7 Kazakhstan 1998 16 Seychelles 1995 15
Bolivia 2000 15 Kenya 1994 22 Sierra Leone 1998 15
Bosnia & Herzegovina 1999 16 Korea 1995 20 Singapore 1994 22
Botswana 1994 21 Kuwait 1994 22 Slovakia 1994 22
Brazil 1995 20 Kyrgyzstan 2002 13 Slovenia 1993 22
Brunei Darussalam 2013 2 Latvia 1993 22 Solomon Islands 1993 21
Bulgaria 1996 19 Lebanon 2007 2 South Africa 1994 37
Burundi 1994 12 Lesotho 1996 18 Spain 1994 21
Canada 1994 21 Liberia 2006 4 Sri Lanka 1996 19
Cape Verde 2001 9 Lithuania 1995 19 Sudan 2000 9
Cayman Islands 2002 5 Luxembourg 1995 20 Swaziland 1994 22
Chile 1994 20 Macao 1996 19 Sweden 1994 21
Colombia 1998 16 Macedonia 2001 14 Switzerland 1993 22
Costa Rica 1993 22 Madagascar 1996 18 Taiwan 1996 19
Croatia 1999 16 Malawi 1994 23 Tajikistan 2012 3
Curacao 1995 16 Malaysia 1995 19 Tanzania 1993 22
Cyprus 1992 23 Maldives 2000 15 Thailand 1993 22
Czech Republic 1994 21 Malta 1992 23 Timor-Leste 2011 1
Denmark 1993 22 Mauritania 2005 3 Tonga 2004 7
Djibouti 2010 5 Mauritius 1992 24 Trinidad & Tobago 1994 21
Dominican Republic 2003 11 Mexico 1996 9 Tunisia 1995 18
Ecuador 2005 6 Moldova 1999 16 Turkey 1994 27
Egypt 2013 3 Mongolia 1997 18 Uganda 2000 16
El Salvador 1993 21 Montenegro 2005 7 Ukraine 1997 16
Estonia 1993 22 Morocco 1994 21 United Arab Emirates 1993 22
Ethiopia 1995 9 Mozambique 1997 17 United Kingdom 1998 18
Fiji 1995 20 Namibia 1999 16 United States 2010 10
Finland 1994 22 Nepal 1997 13 Uruguay 2000 14
France 1993 25 Netherlands 1993 22 Uzbekistan 2003 4
Gambia 1995 10 New Guinea 1996 16 Vanuatu 2003 5
Georgia 1999 16 New Zealand 1995 20 Venezuela 2006 6
Germany 1994 21 Nicaragua 1993 20 Yemen 2000 15
Ghana 1993 34 Nigeria 1993 22 Zambia 1996 16
Greece 1994 21 Norway 1993 23 Zimbabwe 1997 15
Guatemala 2006 9 Oman 1992 23
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Table 2: Multivariate analysis – Small profit/loss region 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the OLS regression analysis for the sample of central banks that report either a small profit or a small loss (i.e. 
central bank profitability ROA is [0; 0.003) or [-0.003; 0), respectively). The dependent variable is an indicator for small profits and equals 1 if the 
central bank reports a small profit in year t. All explanatory variables are expressed as dummy variables using the same cut-off points as in Figure 6 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit Profit
"Hard" budget constraint 0.170** 0.195** 0.166** 0.166** 0.166** 0.146** 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.172*** 0.189*** 0.169** 0.176** 0.174**
(0.068) (0.076) (0.066) (0.070) (0.065) (0.063) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.064) (0.066) (0.061)
High operating expenses 0.154* 0.198*** 0.213*** 0.197*** 0.166** 0.145** 0.121* 0.144** 0.121* 0.132* 0.130* 0.163**
(0.078) (0.061) (0.070) (0.063) (0.059) (0.057) (0.067) (0.057) (0.067) (0.069) (0.072) (0.074)
Right-wing party affiliation 0.201*** 0.199** 0.195** 0.213** 0.203** 0.217*** 0.203** 0.184** 0.153 0.189**
(0.067) (0.079) (0.071) (0.075) (0.079) (0.075) (0.084) (0.086) (0.098) (0.079)
Extreme party affiliation 0.116** 0.005 0.015 0.003 -0.025 -0.002 -0.025 -0.026 -0.017 0.005
(0.055) (0.063) (0.049) (0.046) (0.053) (0.044) (0.055) (0.059) (0.065) (0.055)
Publicly traded central banks 0.102*** 0.095*** 0.090*** 0.105*** 0.090** 0.077** 0.088** 0.101**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038)
Governor re-appointable 0.322*** 0.378*** 0.313*** 0.378*** 0.379*** 0.403*** 0.338***
(0.052) (0.084) (0.045) (0.078) (0.085) (0.089) (0.058)
Low central bank legal independence -0.085 -0.085 -0.081 -0.095
(0.083) (0.079) (0.085) (0.085)
Low central bank transparency 0.033
(0.094)
Low rule of law -0.001
(0.088)
Low government effectiveness -0.113
(0.119)
Low control of corruption -0.126
(0.109)
Do not follow IFRS -0.009
(0.099)
Exchange rate peg -0.053
(0.050)
Introduce exchange rate peg 0.196**
(0.092)
Adandon exchange rate peg -0.221
(0.216)
Constant 0.726*** 0.657*** 0.540*** 0.541*** 0.541*** 0.543*** 0.218** 0.209** 0.220*** 0.209** 0.239** 0.248** 0.232***
(0.054) (0.085) (0.081) (0.084) (0.084) (0.085) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.082) (0.084) (0.089) (0.077)
R2 0.045 0.094 0.210 0.210 0.210 0.220 0.240 0.250 0.250 0.250 0.260 0.270 0.290
Observations 172 88 65 65 65 65 63 63 63 63 63 63 63
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and are coded so that they all predict positive coefficients when associated with higher incentives to avoid losses. “Hard” budget constraint is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if the central bank dividend payout ratio (dividends divided by net income) is greter than 90% (third tertile of the entral 
bank dividend payout distribution) or when a central bank pays dividends despite incurring a loss. The indicator vaible equals 0 if the central banlk 
dividend payout ratio is less than 50% (first tertile of the central bank divididend payout distrribution) or when a central banks receives dividends 
from the government. Operating expenses is the ratio of central bank personnel expenses to the country’s total tax revenues. Right-wing party affiliation 
is an indicator that equals 1 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with the right-leaning party (conservative, Christian democratic, or right-
wing), and 0 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with the left-leaning party (communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing). Extreme 
party affiliation is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a country’s chief executive has affiliation with the nationalist party, and 0 otherwise. Publicly 
traded central banks is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the shares of a central bank are quoted on a public exchange, and 0 otherwise. Governor 
re-appointable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a central bank governor is re-appointable, and 0 otherwise. Central bank legal independence is 
an index of central bank independence. Central bank policy transparency is an index of central bank policy transparency. Rule of law captures the 
extent to which economic agents have trust in and abide by legal institutions. Government effectiveness is the government effectiveness index. Control 
of corruption captures perceptions of the use of power by political elites for private gain. Do not follow IFRS is an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
a central bank prepares financial statements in accordance with local standards, and 0 if it follows IFRS. Exchange rate peg is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if a country has an exchange rate peg, and 0 otherwise. Introduce (Abandon) exchange rate peg is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a 
country introduces (abandons) an exchange rate peg in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors are clustered by central bank and are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for the two-tailed tests.  
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Table 3: Loss avoidance and inflation rates – polynomial regressions 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the OLS regression analysis using all central banks with available 
observations. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is the rate of consumer price inflation. The 
dependent variable in column (6) is the rate of inflation minus the target inflation rate. Column (6) uses 
only central bank that target inflation. Profit is an indicator for whether a central bank reports a profit or a 
loss. Growth rate of nominal GDP is the percentage change in nominal GDP. Low income countries is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if a country is a low-income economy in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Rule 
of law captures the extent to which economic agents have trust in and abide by legal institutions. Right-
leaning party affiliation is an indicator that equals 1 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with the 
right-leaning party, and 0 otherwise. Left-leaning party affiliation is an indicator that equals 1 if the 
country’s chief executive is affiliated with the left-leaning party, and 0 otherwise. Extreme party affiliation 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a country’s chief executive has affiliation with the nationalist party, 
and 0 otherwise. Governor re-appointable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a central bank governor 
is re-appointable, and 0 otherwise. Central bank legal independence is an index of central bank 
independence. Polynomials include a vector of polynomials of ROA up to the factor of 6. We trim ROA at 
the 1st and the 99th percentiles to control for outliers. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are 
based on robust standard errors clustered by central bank. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels for the two-tailed tests.  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation
Inflation less 
target
Profit 2.927** 3.787*** 4.595*** 4.881** 3.800** 2.018*
(1.471) (1.333) (1.683) (2.257) (1.720) (0.991)
Growth rate of nominal GDP -1.409 -1.134 -1.845 -3.303 -1.415
(2.177) (2.154) (2.641) (2.237) (1.641)
Low income countries 1.583 1.541 0.916 -0.311 -0.972**
(1.055) (1.081) (1.199) (0.883) (0.408)
Rule of law -2.754*** -2.998*** -3.398***
(0.553) (0.577) (0.771)
Right-leaning party affiliation 1.695 1.348
(1.367) (1.644)
Left-leaning party affiliation 1.176 1.130
(0.774) (0.905)
Extreme party affiliation -1.684* -1.923*
(0.897) (1.055)
Governor re-appointable -2.605 -3.466
(1.846) (2.465)
Central bank legal independence -0.799
(1.583)
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.020 0.150 0.170 0.190 0.025 0.110
Observations 1,775 1,775 1,775 1,417 1,775 350
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Table 4: Loss avoidance and inflation rates – Narrow interval regressions 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the OLS regression analysis for the sample of central banks that report 
either a small profit or a small loss (i.e. central bank profitability ROA is [0; 0.003) or [-0.003; 0), 
respectively). The dependent variable in columns (1)-(5) is the rate of consumer price inflation. The 
dependent variable in column (6) is the rate of inflation minus the target inflation rate. Column (6) uses 
only central bank that target inflation. Profit is an indicator for whether a central bank reports a profit or a 
loss. Growth rate of nominal GDP is the percentage change in nominal GDP. Low income countries is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if a country is a low-income economy in a given year, and 0 otherwise. Rule 
of law captures the extent to which economic agents have trust in and abide by legal institutions. Right-
leaning party affiliation is an indicator that equals 1 if the country’s chief executive is affiliated with the 
right-leaning party, and 0 otherwise. Left-leaning party affiliation is an indicator that equals 1 if the 
country’s chief executive is affiliated with the left-leaning party, and 0 otherwise. Extreme party affiliation 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a country’s chief executive has affiliation with the nationalist party, 
and 0 otherwise. Governor re-appointable is an indicator variable that equals 1 if a central bank governor 
is re-appointable, and 0 otherwise. Central bank legal independence is an index of central bank 
independence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are based on robust standard errors clustered 
by central bank. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for the two-tailed tests.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation Inflation
Inflation less 
target
Profit 1.357 2.511** 3.590** 3.291* 2.245** 1.553**
(0.976) (0.967) (1.364) (1.731) (0.954) (0.585)
Growth rate of nominal GDP 6.566 8.745 9.257 1.331 -7.434**
(7.359) (7.107) (7.856) (3.842) (3.219)
Low income countries 3.953** 3.370** 1.958 2.112 0.586***
(1.694) (1.345) (1.179) (2.220) (0.073)
Rule of law -1.972** -2.418*** -2.943***
(0.875) (0.842) (1.026)
Right-leaning party affiliation 2.149 2.377
(1.667) (2.041)
Left-leaning party affiliation 2.287 2.952
(1.577) (1.811)
Extreme party affiliation -3.006** -2.863*
(1.431) (1.688)
Governor re-appointable -4.497 -6.281*
(2.756) (3.453)
Central bank independence -3.325
(2.536)
Country fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.003 0.210 0.270 0.290 0.029 0.310
Observations 319 319 319 272 319 57
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Table 5: Taylor rule (policy input) – narrow interval regressions 
 
Notes: The table reports results of the regression analysis for the sample of central banks that report either 
a small profit or a small loss (i.e. central bank profitability ROA is [0; 0.003) or [-0.003; 0), respectively). 
The dependent variable is the interest rate on short-term treasury bills of country i in year t (ri,t). All models 
are estimated using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. Columns (1) and (2) use observations with all 
available data on test variables and sets inflation target at 2% (4.5%) in high income (low income) 
economies if a central bank does not target inflation. Columns (3) and (4) use only central banks that target 
inflation and that have an actual inflation target. Profit is an indicator for whether a central bank reports a 
profit or a loss. (Inflation – target) is the country rate of consumer price inflation of country i in year t-1 
less the central bank target inflation in year t. Interest rate at t-1 is the short-term treasury bill interest rate 
in country i and year t-1. Output gap is the difference between the actual GDP and the predicted GDP using 
the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter for country i and year t-1. Δ Exchange rate is the difference in the 
exchange rate of local currency to USD from t-1 to t for country i. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for the two-tailed tests.  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Inflation - Target) 0.466*** 0.441*** 0.101 0.089
(0.159) (0.149) (0.155) (0.144)
(Inflation - Target) × Profit -0.498*** -0.469*** -0.414** -0.410**
(0.145) (0.132) (0.193) (0.189)
Output gap 4.279 3.479 -0.238 0.501
(5.380) (5.194) (7.530) (7.872)
Profit 2.225*** 2.079*** 0.954** 0.991**
(0.790) (0.758) (0.477) (0.473)
Interest rate at t-1 -0.433*** -0.383*** 0.301** 0.311**
(0.132) (0.128) (0.142) (0.138)
Δ Exchange rate -4.116*** 1.790***
(0.953) (0.664)
Constant 11.789*** 11.413*** 4.220*** 4.098***
(3.043) (2.947) (1.244) (1.230)
Wald χ2 26.21 58.96 26.92 32.62
Observations 118 118 42 42
All countries Inflation targeting countries
